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Abstract 
Although many researchers have been unsuccessful in doing so, I was able to partially 
replicate Dijksterhuis’ (2004) “unconscious thought” effect. I found that participants who 
were distracted with the performance of an irrelevant task made better decisions than 
participants who engaged in conscious thought or participants who made immediate-
decisions. Task directions and population differences in the evaluation of option 
attributes likely represent confounding variables that can disrupt the unconscious thought 
effect. While Dijksterhuis has argued that his findings necessitate the existence of an 
unconscious thought process capable of operating in the absence of attention, I suspect 
that there is a more parsimonious explanation. I suggest that participants may develop 
implicit preference as they read the attribute statements, and that the behavioral 
expression of this preference is moderated by thought condition. 
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Figure Captions 
 
Figure 1. Mean difference values representing the unattractive option rating subtracted 
from the attractive option rating by thought condition. Participants in the 
distraction condition typically display stronger preference for the attractive option 
than participants in the conscious thought and distraction conditions. Results 
taken from the first study described in Dijksterhuis’ 2004 paper. 
 
 
Figure 2. Experiment 3: Percentages of participants in each thought condition that chose 
the attractive option. Participants in the 2.5 minute distraction condition chose the 
attractive car most frequently (M=57%). Participants in the 4-minute distraction 
condition chose the attractive option slightly less frequently (M=50%). 
Participants in the 1-minute distraction condition (M=41%) chose the attractive 
option less frequently than participants in the 4-minute distraction condition. 
Participants in the conscious thought (M=31%) and immediate-decision 
(M=31%) conditions identified the attractive option least frequently. 
 
 
Figure 3.  Experiment 3: Mean number of correct attribute statements describing each 
option in the immediate-decision, 2.5 minute distraction and conscious thought 
conditions. 
 
 
Figure 4. Experiment 3: Percentages of correct negative attribute statements recalled by 
thought condition. 
Thought in the Absence of Attention 
Western Philosophic tradition has long extolled the virtues of rational thought. In 
Phaedrus, Plato described the rational, or conscious, mind as a charioteer struggling to 
maintain control of two powerful horses; one with a noble and virtuous temperament and 
the other with a base and vile character (c. 360 BC). In The Republic, he described a 
utopian republic governed by a philosopher king, a man able to exert rational control of 
his unruly emotions (c. 360 BC). This idea of the rational mind as an entity independent 
from the emotions, and even independent from the body itself, has persisted into 
modernity. We can see it clearly in the writing of Descartes, who questioned the veracity 
of all information received from the senses and who built his philosophy upon one fact he 
did not question: “cogito ergo sum” or “I think, therefore I am” (1647/1903). Classical 
conceptions of the relationship between cognition and emotion are still strongly 
influential today.  
Modern researchers, however, have found that the relationship between conscious 
and unconscious thought processes is more complex than previously assumed. We now 
know that our behavior is directly influenced by processes of which we are unaware. 
Researchers have demonstrated that behavior is affected by stimuli that are not 
consciously perceived (Murphy & Zajonc, 1993), by information that was consciously 
perceived but forgotten (Ebbinghaus, 1885/1964; Korsakoff, 1889 as reported in 
Schacter, 1987; Claparede, 1911, as reported in Johnson et al., 1985; Johnson et al., 
1985), and by cognitive processes of which we are unaware (Betsch et al., 2001; Bechara 
& Damasio, 1997; Bechara et al., 2005; Dijksterhuis, 2004). Wilson and Schooler 
(Wilson, 1991; Wilson et al., 1993) have shown that we sometimes make better decisions 
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when we do not engage in conscious thought. Dijksterhuis and colleagues (Dijksterhuis, 
2004; Dijksterhuis et al., 2006; Bos et al., 2008) have recently argued that we are capable 
of actively processing information even while our conscious resources are distracted with 
the performance of a non-related task.  
       While Dijksterhuis’ findings are intriguing, they provide inconclusive evidence to 
posit the existence of an active implicit thought system. It is more parsimonious to 
conclude that his results reflect coordination between active explicit thought processes 
and passive implicit emotional processes. The latter conjecture also provides a better fit 
with other research.  
Non-Conscious Perception and Preference Development  
Pierce and Jastrow (1885) were the first researchers to show a discrepancy 
between perception and conscious experience. They asked participants to discriminate 
between various stimuli in terms of weight and brightness. The differences between these 
stimuli attributes were successively reduced until participants reported no confidence in 
their ability to discriminate between them. When asked to guess, however, participants 
were able to perform at rates significantly better than chance. This finding demonstrates 
that we are able perceive more information from the exogenous world than we are aware, 
and represents the first evidence of subliminal perception.  
Almost 100 years later, Kunst-Wilson and Zajonc (1980) used the mere exposure 
effect (Zajonc, 1968) to investigate whether subliminal stimuli could influence 
preference. Participants were shown 20 octagonal shapes for 1 millisecond (ms) each, and 
then were given a discrimination test in which they were asked to differentiate between 
familiar and novel stimuli. As expected, in a direct recognition task, performance was no 
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better than chance. However, in an indirect preference task, in which participants were 
asked report how much they liked each shape, participants tended to prefer the familiar 
shape. These preference judgments depended not only upon the subliminal perception of 
intrinsic properties (such as weight, brightness or shape) of exogenous objects, but upon 
memories concerning the perception of these objects.  
Murphy and Zajonc (1993) presented participants with a number of Chinese 
characters preceded by the subliminal presentation (4 ms.) of positive or negative 
affective primes. They were able to manipulate subsequent ratings of attractiveness for 
these characters by controlling the emotional content of the primes. Interestingly, when 
the same primes were presented supraliminally (1000 ms.) this effect was not found. 
Whereas irrelevant subliminal emotional content affected preference, irrelevant 
supraliminal content did not. This finding suggests that the process underlying the effect 
of subliminal primes is both automatic (it requires no conscious effort) and diffuse (it is 
affected by irrelevant factors, such as temporal proximity). It also suggests that conscious 
evaluative processes either disrupt the effect of the subliminal primes or discount the 
source of the affective response.  
Amnesia and Non-Conscious Influences on Affective Preference  
Eduard Claparede (as cited in Johnson et al., 1985) was the first to report evidence 
for non-conscious emotional memory in a patient with anterograde amnesia. Although 
this patient was unable to remember past interactions with the doctor (Claparede had to 
introduce himself each time they met), her behavior was clearly influenced by their past 
interactions. To demonstrate this point, Claparede hid a pin in his hand one day, and upon 
shaking his patient’s hand, pricked her with it. Although she was unable to recall this 
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event, she refused to shake his hand the next time they met, explaining that “sometimes 
people hide pins in their hands.”  
Johnson and colleagues (1985) investigated affective preference development in a 
population of amnesic Korsakoff’s patients. In their first experiment, they presented these 
patients and several age-matched alcoholic controls with several unfamiliar Korean 
melodies. In a subsequent recognition test, controls demonstrated high accuracy in 
differentiating between novel and familiar melodies. Patients, however, were unable to do 
so at rates significantly above chance. Interestingly, in a preference task, patients’ 
subjective ratings of the melodies clearly differentiated between the novel and familiar 
tunes. In a second experiment, these researchers presented the same participants with 
fictional biographical information describing a good person and a bad person. In a direct 
memory test given 20 days later, patients displayed less explicit knowledge for this 
information than control participants. However, when given an indirect test, 78% of 
patients demonstrated preference for the good character. Amnesic patients, like normal 
participants are therefore influenced by the mere exposure effect. Moreover, these 
findings represent additional evidence of distinct explicit and implicit memory systems.  
Non-Conscious Cognitive Processes and Preference Development  
In certain situations, rational thought can lead to less desirable decisions than no 
thought at all. Wilson and Schooler (1991) have found that the choices made by students 
who consciously analyzed reasons for strawberry jam preference were less likely to 
coincide with expert rankings than were those made by students who did not consciously 
analyze reasons for their preference. Similarly, they found that the choices made by 
students who consciously analyzed their reasons for choosing a college course 
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corresponded less-well with expert choice. A different group of participants, who heeded 
their “gut” feelings instead of analyzing their reasons for preference, was also more 
satisfied with their choices for posters two-weeks later. Wilson and Schooler (1991) have 
proposed that we do not have conscious access to the reasons for our subjective 
preference and so, when we are asked to engage in rational thought processes, we tend to 
inappropriately weight those reasons which are available to consciousness. Again, it 
seems that these rational thought processes either mask or disrupt the process of implicit 
preference development.  
Betsch and colleagues (Betsch et al., 2001; Betsch et al., 2006) have provided 
insight concerning this non-conscious process. They have proposed that implicit 
components of memories for various options are stored separately from explicit 
components in a hypothetical memory structure dubbed the value account. Information 
stored in this account is developed through a cumulative process that occurs during the 
perception of information concerning various options. This process reflects a gradual 
accumulation of preference that occurs in a single memory store as novel information is 
processed. Betsch and colleagues have supported this conjecture through findings in a 
stock-preference task. Participants were shown information concerning share values of 
stocks either under conditions of divided attention (the implicit cognition condition) or 
undivided attention (the explicit cognition condition). While the preferences of 
participants in the explicit condition reflected a mathematical average of share 
information, preferences of participants in the divided attention condition suggested a 
summative process. This is an interesting distinction, as the calculation of a mathematical 
average requires the active manipulation of memories concerning individual shares. A 
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summative process requires no memory for individual shares, but only for the cumulative 
value of these shares. Betsch and colleagues (Betsch et al., 2001; Betsch et al., 2006) 
therefore suggested that implicit preferences are developed during the perception of 
relevant information. Although explicit knowledge of this information may be lost, the 
cumulative value of this information (which is stored in the value account) is capable of 
influencing subsequent behavior.  
Bechara and Damasio (Bechara et al., 1997; Bechara & Damasio, 2005) have 
suggested that the development of this type of unconscious knowledge is dependent on 
emotional processes, and that this knowledge exerts its behavioral influence by directly 
affecting our somatic states. They have supported this hypothesis through research with 
the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). In this task, participants are given a chance to win money 
by drawing cards from four decks of cards. Unbeknownst to participants, two decks are 
advantageous, yielding a net monetary reward if consistently drawn. The remaining decks 
are risky, yielding larger rewards, but ultimately yielding a net loss if consistently drawn. 
Normal participants typically display an increase in advantageous behavior (an increased 
proportion of draws from the advantageous decks) before they are able to express explicit 
knowledge for the advantageous strategy. This finding is interpreted as evidence of 
implicit knowledge of the advantageous strategy.  
When Bechara and Damasio (1997) measured skin conductance response (SCR), 
a measure associated with emotional arousal, during performance of the IGT, they found 
that inexperienced normal participants displayed SCR when they received monetary 
reward or punishment. Normal participants with moderate experience displayed SCR 
preceding all draws, and highly-experienced participants displayed elevated SCR 
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preceding draws from the risky decks only. Participants with amygdalar lesions, however 
did not display advantageous behavior and did not show elevated SCR at any point 
during the task (Bechara and Damasio, 2005). Participants with lesions to the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) similarly did not show advantageous behavior, 
and showed elevated SCR only when they experienced reward or punishment. Based on 
these findings, the researchers argued that the amygdala is critically involved in the 
mediation of somatic states induced by primary inducers. Primary inducers are 
exogenous stimuli that carry emotional value acquired through innate predispositions 
towards, or through experience with, these stimuli. These researchers have also suggested 
that the VMPFC mediates somatic states induced by secondary inducers, endogenous 
stimuli (such as memories) that carry emotional salience.  
Bechara and Damasio’s somatic marker hypothesis (SMH) extends Betsch’s value 
account hypothesis by specifying the means by which unconscious evaluative 
information is expressed behaviorally. Critically, while we may be aware of the 
physiological sensations associated with the emotional reaction to a given stimulus, we 
might not have explicit knowledge concerning the events that gave rise to these feelings. 
For instance, while we may know that we are deathly afraid of horses by the beating in 
our chests and the weakness in our knees, we may not necessarily remember the specific 
childhood event that was the original source of this association.  
Thought in the Absence of Attention  
Like Wilson and Schooler (1991), Dijksterhuis (Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis 
et al, 2006a) has argued that rational thought can lead to less desirable decisions than no 
thought at all. He has demonstrated that for specific types of problems, participants who 
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engage in rational thought actually perform worse than participants who make 
immediate-decisions, and participants who spend an equal amount of time engaged in the 
performance of an irrelevant task.  
In a typical unconscious thought experiment, participants are asked to choose 
between four normatively-ranked options (e.g., various cars, various apartments or 
various roommates), each of which is described by 12 attribute options. The attractive 
option is typically described by 8 positive attribute sentences (e.g., “The Hatsdun car has 
a nice paint job”) and 4 negative attribute sentences (e.g., “The Hatsdun car does not 
have cupholders”). Conversely, the unattractive option is typically described by 4 
positive attribute statements and 8 negative attribute statements. Two moderately-
attractive options are typically included to increase the difficulty of the decision task. 
Each of these options is typically described by 6 positive and 6 negative attribute 
statements. Each attribute sentence is presented one a time on a computer screen, for 
three seconds each and in random order.  
After all of the 48 attribute sentences are presented, participants are divided into 
three thought conditions: an immediate-decision condition (in which participants are 
asked to make decisions immediately after reading the attribute sentences), a conscious 
thought condition (in which participants are given 2-4 minutes to think carefully before 
making a decision), and a distraction condition (in which participants are distracted for 3-
4 minutes with the performance of an N-Back task or an anagram puzzle problem task).  
After completing the requirements of the various thought conditions, participants 
are typically asked to rate each of the options on a Likert-type scale and/or to simply 
identify the best option. Dijksterhuis has reported two interesting findings. The first is 
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that participants in the distraction condition typically display better preference than 
participants in the immediate-decision condition. The second is that participants in the 
conscious thought condition typically do not display better preference than participants in 
the immediate-decision condition (Figure 1). This second finding is not wholly 
surprising, as it closely mirrors Wilson and Schooler’s (1991; 1993) findings.  
Dijksterhuis’ first finding, that participants in the distraction condition tend to 
perform better than participants in the immediate-decision condition, however, is 
something of a puzzle. Dijksterhuis has argued that this finding necessitates the existence 
of a cognitive process that is capable of evaluating option-relevant information in the 
absence of attention. However, I suspect a more parsimonious explanation. 
Alternative Explanation  
As mentioned, in a successful replication of an unconscious thought experiment, 
participants in the distraction conditions typically demonstrate significantly better 
preference than participants in the conscious thought and immediate-decision conditions. 
Dijksterhuis has argued that this finding necessitates the existence of an unconscious 
cognitive process that is capable of actively evaluating and manipulating declarative 
attribute knowledge while participants are engaged in the performance of an irrelevant 
task. It seems more parsimonious, however, to suspect that participants may develop 
implicit emotional preference for the various options (i.e., a sense of gist or a “gut-
feeling”, or a “value store”) as they read the attribute sentences (Lassiter et al., 2009) and 
that the behavioral expression of this preference is moderated by thought condition. This 
explanation would provide a closer fit with findings described by other researchers 
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(Bechara & Damasio, 2005; Bechara, Tanel, & Damasio, 1997; Betsch et al., 2001; 
Johnson et al., 1985; Murphy & Zajonc, 1993; Wilson & Schooler, 1991; Zajonc, 1968).  
As the attractiveness of the various options is operationalized by the ratio of 
positive to negative attribute statements used to describe them, it is not advantageous to 
engage in excessive analysis of individual attribute statements. A participant who acts in 
accordance with the outcome of a summative evaluative process will likely express more 
accurate preference than participants who do not consider all attribute statements. As the 
development of implicit preference likely reflects a summative process (Betsch et al, 
2001; Betsch et al., 2006), all participants likely tend to develop relatively accurate 
implicit preference during the attribute display block. Participants who make decisions in 
accordance with this implicit preference will likely tend to express the strongest relative 
preference for the operationally-defined attractive option. It is less likely that the 
expressed preference of participants who engage in rational analysis of specific attribute 
statements will reflect the operationally-determined normative ranking. 
 It certainly seems plausible that participants in the conscious thought condition, 
who were instructed to engage in careful rational thought, would report the outcome of 
their rational thought processes rather than their “gut feeling”. These participants likely 
engage in rational analysis of declarative memories for attribute statements and, as 
Wilson and Schooler suggested (Wilson & Schooler 1991; Wilson et al., 1993), tend to 
place excessive weight on those attributes that are available to consciousness. In 
Dijksterhuis’ paradigm, they likely tend to make decisions in accordance with the 
outcome of these rational processes.  
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As participants in the immediate-decision condition likely have better declarative 
knowledge of the attribute statements than participants in the distraction and conscious-
thought conditions, it is possible that this declarative knowledge might discourage the 
behavioral expression of implicit preference. Participants in the immediate-decision 
condition may have equivalent implicit preference for the attractive option as participants 
in the distraction condition, but may be discouraged from expressing it. 
       Whereas Dijksterhuis has posited that implicit preference changes during the 
performance of the distraction task, within the framework outlined above, implicit 
preference would remain stable during this time.  
Inconsistent Replication  
Another important concern about Dijksterhuis’ work is that the results have not 
been consistently replicated by other researchers. Thorsteinsen and Withrow (2009) 
conducted two studies designed to replicate Dijksterhuis’ experimental paradigm within 
an undergraduate population at the University of Idaho. Four normatively-ranked 
apartments were each described by 15 attribute statements. Each of the 60 attribute 
statements was presented one at a time for four seconds each. The order of attribute 
presentation was random, but the attribute statements were blocked by apartment. After 
the stimulus display, participants were divided into three conditions. In the conscious 
thought condition, participants were given four minutes to think carefully about “which 
apartment they liked best.” Participants in a memory aid condition spent four minutes 
listing the reasons for their preference. Participants in the unconscious thought condition 
spent four minutes completing an N-Back task. These researchers did not include an 
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immediate-decision condition. Thorsteinsen and Withrow found no significant difference 
in apartment preference between modes of thought.  
Newell and colleagues (2008) conducted a pilot study designed to assess the 
importance of 16 apartment dimensions. In Experiment 1, they used only the five highest 
and five lowest attribute dimensions across all apartments. This is somewhat of a 
departure from Dijksterhuis’ paradigm, as Dijksterhuis rejected the extreme dimensions 
and used only those that were of moderate importance. Participants in Newell and 
colleagues’ study were students at the University of New South Wales, Australia. Forty 
attribute sentences describing the four apartments were presented in random order for 
four seconds each. After the stimulus display, participants were divided into immediate-
decision, conscious thought (4 minutes), and distraction conditions (4 minutes of an 
anagram puzzle problem task). The researchers observed that participants in all 
conditions tended to choose the apartment that matched their idiosyncratic ratings of 
attribute importance. They found, however, no evidence that unconscious thought is 
preferable to conscious thought.  
In a second experiment, Newell and colleagues used the same attribute sentences 
as Experiment 1, but displayed them all at one time via an “information board” that was 
displayed for three minutes. Participants were then divided into four conditions: a 
conscious thought condition (8 minutes), a distraction condition (8 minutes of anagram 
puzzle problems), a conscious thought with information condition (participants were able 
to see the information board during the eight minutes of conscious thought) and an 
immediate-decision condition. As in Experiment 1, the researchers did not find evidence 
that unconscious thought may be preferable to conscious thought. In a third experiment, 
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Newell and colleagues attempted to directly replicate Dijksterhuis’ 2006 study. They 
used the attribute statements provided in the online supplemental information to 
Dijksterhuis’ study (Dijksterhuis, 2006b), and increased their sample size to increase 
statistical power. Again, however, they were unsuccessful in replicating Dijksterhuis’ 
finding.  
Rey and colleagues (2009) also used the attribute statements provided in the 
online supplementary info for Dijksterhuis’ 2006 experiment (2006b) to investigate the 
unconscious thought effect within student population at the University of Bourgogne in 
France. Participants in the immediate-decision condition performed best while distracted 
participants performed only slightly better than conscious thinkers.  
Acker (2008) conducted a meta-analysis of several published and unpublished 
studies investigating Dijksterhuis’ effect. He found that results were inconsistent and 
provided little evidence of active unconscious thought. Several members of Dijksterhuis’ 
lab, however, are currently conducting a meta-analysis of over 30 published and several 
unpublished studies (Strick et al., 2009) and suggest that the unconscious thought 
phenomenon has a moderately strong effect size (.402). It is difficult to understand why 
this discrepancy exists, but it should be noted that many that a majority of failed 
replications seem to be occurring outside of the Netherlands.  
To establish the existence of the unconscious thought effect and to investigate my 
hypotheses about alternative explanations, I conducted three experiments. All 
experiments were conducted in private rooms via personal computer running Inquisit by 
Millisecond Software.  
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Experiment 1  
 In Experiment 1, I sought to replicate Dijksterhuis’ methods as reported in his 
2004 paper. In addition, in order to assess implicit preference, and to determine whether 
participants in all thought conditions hold equivalent implicit preference for the attractive 
option, I included a semantic priming task. If I was successful in replicating the 
unconscious thought effect, I predicted that participants in the immediate-decision and 
distraction conditions would demonstrate equivalent performance in this task. If 
participants in the distraction condition demonstrated stronger preference for the 
attractive option via the semantic priming task than participants in the immediate-
decision condition, this would support Dijksterhuis’ conjecture that participants actively 
process information during the distraction condition. I began by piloting a number of 
attribute statements that would be used to describe four apartments.  
Pilot Study  
I informally piloted 40 original attribute statements about apartments on a mixed-
gender group of 15 graduate and undergraduate students at WWU. I asked participants to 
rate the attractiveness and the importance of each attribute statement via a ten-point scale. 
I selected only attribute statements that were moderately influential. The attribute 
statements included in the experiment can be found in Appendix A.  
Method  
Participants. Seventy-eight undergraduate psychology students at WWU 
participated in exchange for partial course credit. Assignment to thought condition was 
randomly determined. 
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Procedure and materials.  
      Practice blocks. After completing consent forms, participants were advised that 
they would be “presented with a list of sentences describing various apartments” and 
would be “asked to make decisions based upon this information.” They were also advised 
that they would “participate in two different kinds of tasks: the ‘2’ Back task and the 
‘Reaction Time’ task.”  
Participants then completed a practice two-back task consisting of 11 items. The 
N-back task (in this case, a 2-Back task) is a challenging working memory task. In it, a 
seemingly random sequence of numbers is presented in the center of the computer screen. 
Each number is presented one at a time and participants are asked to indicate whether the 
displayed number matches the number that was presented n-back in the sequence. In the 
present 2-back task, participants are asked to press the space bar to indicate when the 
displayed number was the same as the number displayed 2-back in the sequence.  
The 2-back practice block repeated until participants were able to perform the task 
with 80% accuracy. After completing this practice block, participants then performed a 
practice semantic priming task. In this practice block, two words were shown in quick 
succession and participants were asked to indicate whether the second word was positive 
or negative. The primes (the initial word of each pair) were musical instruments (e.g., 
“Tuba”, “Violin”, “Bassoon”, “Guitar”) and the second items were either positive (e.g., 
“Wonderful”, “Pleasure”, “Honest”) or negative words (e.g., “Awful”, Disaster”, 
“Nasty”).  
Each trial was preceded with a 1000ms pause, at which time a fixation point (“+”) 
appeared in the center of the computer screen for 300ms. This fixation point served to 
 
 
16 
 
alert participants as to the location of the subsequent prime and target words. After the 
fixation point appeared, the prime was presented in the same location for 600ms. The 
prime was followed by a blank screen for 100ms, after which a positive or negative target 
word was presented. 
To indicate the valence of the second word, participants were asked to press keys 
on the left side (the “a” key) and right side (the “5” key located in the number pad) of the 
keyboard, which were clearly marked with temporary yellow stickers. These keys were 
counterbalanced between participants. Participants were encouraged to “respond as fast 
as possible”, even if that led them “to make a few errors.” If participants pressed the 
wrong key, a red “Error” message would flash on the computer screen. The practice 
block consisted of 8 trials. 
       Initial instructions. Before completing the practice blocks, participants were 
informed that they would be presented with information about apartment choices and that 
they would then be asked to make decisions based on this information. After completing 
the practice blocks, participants were informed that they had completed the practice 
blocks, and that the experiment was about to start. Complete instructions are available in 
Appendix B.  
     Timing and format. Each of the 48 attribute sentences used to describe the 
four apartment options was presented in random order, one at a time, in the center of the 
computer screen for four seconds. After all sentences had been displayed, participants 
were divided into their randomly-assigned thought condition: immediate-decision, 
conscious thought, or distraction. Participants in the immediate-decision condition were 
asked to make decisions immediately after the sentences had been displayed. Participants 
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in the conscious-thought condition were given three minutes think carefully about their 
reasons for preference.  Participants in the distraction condition performed a two-back 
task for three minutes.  
After completing the requirements of the various thought conditions, half of the 
participants first rated the attractiveness of each of the apartments and then completed the 
semantic priming task. The other half of the participants first completed the semantic 
priming task, and then rated each of the options. The rating task involved rating each of 
the apartments in random order. Participants were asked to provide responses via a ten-
point Likert-type scale in which “1” was anchored with the phrase “Extremely 
Unattractive” and 10 was anchored with the phrase “Extremely Attractive”. (A complete 
list of anchors is available in Appendix B). The semantic priming task was the similar to 
practice semantic priming task completed before the attribute display period, however, 
the primes were now the attractive (the Canterbury Apartment) and the unattractive (the 
Heatherstone Apartment) options.  
As mentioned, participants were either asked to press a button on the right side of 
the keyboard (the “5” key located in the number pad) or on the left side of the keyboard 
(the “A” key). Both keys were marked with yellow stickers. Half of the participants were 
asked to press the right button in response to a good target word, and the left button in 
response to a bad target word. The other half of participants were asked to press the left 
button in response to a good target word, and the right button in response to a bad target 
word. RT was measured from the onset of the target word. A 200ms pause followed each 
trial.  
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After performing the semantic priming task and rating the options, participants 
then chose the best apartment. They then indicated their confidence in this choice via a 
ten-point Likert-type scale. “1” was anchored with the phrase “Not Confident at All” and 
10 was anchored with the phrase “Completely Confident”. Participants were then asked 
to recall, via a free-response format, all of the attractive and unattractive features of this 
apartment.  
Results  
 Rating task. For all participants, there was a significant main effect of apartment 
in the rating task F(3,225) = 15.53, MSE = 4.07, p < .01, partial η2 = .172. Across 
conditions, participants tended to rate the attractive apartment (M = 7.04, SD = 1.52) 
higher than the first (M = 5.55, SD = 2.1) and second (M = 6.23, SD = 1.95) moderately 
attractive apartments. The unattractive apartment (M = 4.95, SD = 1.95) was rated as less 
attractive than all other options. There was no main effect of thought condition F(2,75) = 
.91, MSE = 2.30, p = .41, partial η2= .024. The key interaction between thought 
condition and option was also not significant, F(6,225) = .428, MSE = 4.07, p = .86, 
partial η
2= .011. Cell means can be found in Table 1. 
To account for possible carry-over effects from the semantic priming task, I 
analyzed rating task results for only those participants who took the rating task before the 
semantic priming task. There was a significant main effect of apartment, F(3,111) = 
15.07, MSE = 3.70, p < .01, partial η2 = .29. These participants tended to rate the 
attractive option (M = 7.28, SD = 1.45) as being more attractive than the first (M = 5.3, 
SD = 2.12) and second (M = 6.48, SD = 1.71) moderately attractive apartments. All other 
apartments were rated as more attractive than the unattractive apartment (M = 4.6, SD = 
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2.02). There was no main effect of thought condition F(2,37) = .62, MSE = 2.64, p = 
.544, partial η2= .032. The key interaction was also not significant, F(6,111) = .78, 
MSE= 3.70, p = .59, partial η2 = .041. Cell means can be found in Table 2. 
Semantic priming task. Semantic priming data were analyzed with a 3x4 mixed 
ANOVA. For all participants, there was no main effect of option on overall RT, F(1,75) 
= .25, MSE = 647.65, p = .62, partial η2 < .01. The interaction between apartment and 
thought condition was not significant, F(2,75) = 0.721, MSE = 647.65,  p = .49, partial 
η
2= .02. There was no interaction between target and thought condition, F(2,75) = .11, 
MSE = 879.65, p = .89, partial η2 < .01. There was no interaction between apartment and 
target, F(1,75)=.01, MSE = 897.18, p=.09, partial η2 < .01. The key three-way 
interaction between thought condition, apartment and target was not significant, F(2,75) 
= .38, MSE = 897.18,  p = .69, partial η2 = .01. Cell Means can be found in Table 3. 
To account for possible carry-over effects from the rating task, I analyzed SP 
results for only those participants who took the semantic priming task before the rating 
task. For these participants, there was a significant main effect of apartment, F(1,35) = 
5.94, MSE = 532.06, p = .02, partial η2 = .15. Regardless of thought condition, these 
participants were faster to respond to the attractive option (M = 569.37) than to the 
unattractive option (M = 578.51). There was no main effect of thought condition, F(2,35) 
= .08, p=.93  partial η2 <  .01. The interaction between apartment and thought condition 
approached significance, F(2,35) = 2.63, MSE = 532.06, p = .09, partial η2= .13. 
Participants in the conscious thought condition were faster to respond to the unattractive 
option (M = 568.43, standard error = 18.95) than were participants in the immediate-
decision condition (M = 577.65, standard error = 17.55). Participants in the unconscious 
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thought condition were slowest to respond to the unattractive option (M = 589.44, 
standard error=18.95). The interaction between target and thought condition was not 
significant F(2,35) = .98, MSE = 661.73, p = .39, partial η2 = .05. The interaction 
between target and apartment was also not significant, F(1,35) = .151, MSE = 661.73, p 
= .70, partial η2 < .01. The key 3-way interaction between thought condition, target and 
apartment was also not significant, F(2,35) = 1.73, MSE = 661.73 p = .19, partial η2 = 
.09. Cell means can be found in Table 4 
Choice task.  There were no significant differences between thought conditions in 
the proportion of participants who chose the attractive apartment, χ2(2, n = 78) = 0.37, p 
= .83, phi = .07. Simple effects analyses also did not reveal any differences between the 
distraction condition and the immediate decision condition, χ2(1, n = 52) = .27, p = .606. 
There was also no significant difference in the proportion of participants in the conscious 
thought and distraction conditions who chose the attractive option χ2(1, n = 50) = .30, p = 
.59. Cell means can be found in Table 5. 
Confidence. Differences between conditions for participant’s ratings of 
confidence in identifying the best option was not significant F(2,75) = .06, p = .94, MSE 
= 0.48, partial η2 < .01.  
Free recall. Because I was unsuccessful in replicating the unconscious thought 
effect, I did not analyze the free-recall data.  
Discussion  
Experiment 1 represents a failure to replicate the unconscious thought effect using 
the methods described in the first study of Dijksterhuis’ 2004 paper. Although I predicted 
no interaction between thought condition and preference in the semantic priming task, 
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this result is somewhat meaningless, as the participants in the distraction condition did 
not demonstrate more accurate preference via the rating or choice tasks than participants 
in the immediate-decision condition. 
 In an unintentional deviation from Dijksterhuis’ paradigm, the same attribute 
dimensions were not used across all options. In other words, while one apartment was 
described as “having a good gym” the attribute statements concerning the other options 
did not describe a gym at all. At this point it is unclear whether this deviation may have 
affected the results. However, this increase in the number of unique descriptors may have 
decreased the complexity of the attribute display, thereby facilitating the development of 
advantageous preference. This conjecture is supported by the finding that participants in 
all thought conditions were able to differentiate between the attractive and unattractive 
options. Additionally, participants were more successful at differentiating between the 
attractive (M = 7.04) and unattractive (M = 4.96) options than were Dijksterhuis’ 
participants (attractive option M = 6.18, unattractive option M = 5.38). It is possible that 
participants in the present study developed strong preference as they read the attribute 
statements, and that the subsequent performance of the various thought conditions was 
insufficient to alter this preference.  
 It is also possible that the task instructions delivered prior to the attribute 
statement display block may have disrupted the unconscious thought effect. Lassiter et al. 
(2009) were successful in replicating the effect when they instructed participants to form 
impressions of each option, but was unsuccessful when he asked participants to 
memorize the statements. They found that participants who performed a distractor task 
performed best when instructed to form impressions of the various options. They also 
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found that participants in the conscious thought condition performed best when given 
instructions to memorize the attribute statements. I instructed participants to form 
impressions of the various options and to remember the various attribute sentences. The 
combination of both sets of instructions may have disrupted the unconscious thought 
effect. 
Experiment 2  
Experiment 2 was an attempt to directly replicate the methods used by 
Dijksterhuis in the first experiment of his 2006 paper (Dijksterhuis et al, 2006a). I also 
used the same attribute statements (Dijksterhuis et al., 2006b). There were two deviations 
from Dijksterhuis’ experimental paradigm: first, participants performed a two-back task 
rather than a set of anagram puzzle problems and second, participants in the distraction 
condition performed a semantic priming task either before or after the rating task. 
Dijksterhuis has used the two-back task in a number of successful experiments, so it is 
unlikely that this deviation affected the results. 
Method  
Participants. Seventy-three undergraduate psychology students at WWU 
participated in exchange for partial course credit. Assignment to thought condition was 
randomly determined. 
Procedure and materials.  
 Practice blocks. As in Experiment 1, all participants performed a practice two-
back task and a practice semantic priming task before the attribute display. These practice 
tasks were as described above.  
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Initial instructions. Before completing the practice blocks, participants were 
informed that they would be shown many sentences describing four different cars: the 
“Nabusi”, the “Dasuka”, the “Kaiwa”, and the “Hatsdun". They were also informed that 
their job would be to choose the best car. Complete instructions are available in 
Appendix C. 
Timing and format. The 48 attribute sentences (available in Appendix D) were 
presented in random order. Each sentence was presented in the center of the computer 
screen for 8 seconds. After each of the sentences had been displayed, participants were 
divided into their randomly-assigned thought conditions: immediate-decision, conscious 
thought, or distraction. Participants in the immediate-decision condition were asked to 
make decisions immediately after the sentences had been displayed. Participants in the 
conscious-thought condition were given four minutes to deliberate and were instructed to 
“take this time to think very carefully about the cars”. Participants in the distraction 
condition performed a two-back task for four minutes.  
After completing the requirements of the various thought conditions, half of the 
participants first completed the rating task and then the semantic priming task. The other 
half of the participants first completed the semantic priming task, and then rating task. 
The rating task and semantic priming task followed the same format as outlined in 
Experiment 1. After completing the SP and rating tasks, participants were asked to 
identify the best car, were asked to indicate their confidence in this choice and then were 
asked to recall as many attractive and unattractive features about this car as possible.  
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Results  
Rating task. For all participants, there was a significant main effect of car F(3, 
210) = 38.79, MSE = 3.20, p < .01, partial η2 =.36. The attractive car (M = 7.04, SD = 
1.78) was rated as more attractive than the first moderately-attractive car (M = 6.64, SD 
= 1.81), which was rated as more attractive than the second moderately-attractive car (M 
= 5.23, SD = 1.59), which was rated as more attractive than the unattractive car (M = 
4.20, SD = 1.61). There was no main effect of thought condition, F(2, 70) = .62, MSE = 
2.04, p = .54, partial η2=.02. The interaction was also not significant, F(6, 210) = .77, 
MSE = 3.20, p = .6, partial η2 = .02. Cell means can be found in Table 6. 
To account for possible carry-over effects from the semantic priming task, I 
analyzed rating task results for only those participants who took the rating task before the 
semantic priming task. For participants these participants, there was a significant main 
effect of car F(3, 96) = 19.04, MSE = 3.32, p < .01, partial η2=.37. The attractive car (M 
= 7.60, SD = 1.52) was rated as more attractive than the first moderately-attractive car 
(M = 6.37, SD = 2.04), which was rated as more attractive than the second moderately-
attractive car (M = 5.2, SD = 1.8), which was rated as more attractive than the 
unattractive car (M = 4.46, SD = 1.58). There no significant main effect of thought 
condition F(2,32) = 1.37, MSE = 2.33, p = .27, partial η2= .08. The predicted interaction 
was also not significant F(6, 96) = .79, MSE = 3.32, p = .58, partial η2 = .05. Cell means 
can be found in Table 7.  
 Across conditions, there were no differences in response latency during the rating 
task, F(1,70) = .25, p = .78, partial η2 = .01. There was also no main effect of car 
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F(3,210) = .67, p = .57, partial η2 = .01. Nor was there an interaction, F(6,210) = 8.32, p 
= .23, partial η2 = .04.  
Semantic priming task. For all participants, there was no significant main effect 
of option F(1,70) = .66, MSE = 2221.04, p = .42, partial η2= .01. There was also no main 
effect of thought condition, F(2,70) = .03, MSE = 19617.70, p = .97, partial η2 < .01. 
There was also no interaction between car and thought condition F(2,70) = .19, MSE = 
2221.04, p = .83, partial η2 < .01. There was no interaction between car and target, 
F(1,70) = .56, MSE = 906.57, p = .46, partial η2= .01. The key interaction between car, 
target and thought condition was not significant, F(2,70) = .2, MSE = 906.57, p = .818, 
partial η
2
 = .01. Cell means can be found in Table 8. 
To account for possible carry-over effects from the rating task, I analyzed SP 
results for only those participants who took the semantic priming task before the rating 
task. There was no significant main effect of car, F(1,33) < .01, MSE = 464.14, p = .99, 
partial η
2
 < .01. There was no significant main effect of thought condition, F(2, 33) = 
.32, MSE = 21230.94, p= .72, partial η2 = .020. The interaction between car and thought 
condition was not significant, F(2, 33) = .79, MSE = 464.14, p = .46, partial η2 = .046. 
The interaction between car and target was not significant, F(1, 33) = .46, MSE = 829.14, 
p=.5, partial η2=.01. The interaction between car, target and thought condition was also 
not significant, F(2, 33) = .09, MSE = 829.14, p = .911, partial η2 = .01. Cell means can 
be found in Table 9. 
Choice task. There were no significant differences in the proportion of 
participants in each thought condition who chose the attractive option, χ2(2, n = 73) = 
1.74, p = .42. There was also no significant difference in the proportion of participants in 
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the immediate-decision and distraction conditions who chose the attractive option χ2(1, n 
= 55) = .1.52, p = .22.  Nor was there a significant difference in the proportion of 
participants in the conscious thought decision and distraction conditions who chose the 
attractive option χ2(1, n = 48) = .01, p = .94 . Cell means can be found in Table 10. 
   Confidence. Between thought conditions, participants did not indicate significant 
differences in their confidence of choice F(2,72) = .38, MSE = .681, p=.68, partial η2= 
.01.  
Free recall task. Because I was unsuccessful in replicating the unconscious 
thought effect, I did not analyze the free-recall data. 
Discussion  
 Experiment 2 was a literal replication of an experiment outlined in Dijksterhuis’ 
2006 paper (Dijksterhuis et al., 2006a; Dijksterhuis et al., 2006b). I used the same 
attribute sentences and procedure (with the exception of the semantic priming task and 
use of the two-back instead of a puzzle problem task). I found no evidence of 
unconscious thought. Participants in the distraction condition did not display more 
accurate preference for the attractive option than did participants in other conditions. This 
was true for results in the rating task, the choice task and the semantic priming task.  
Participants in all thought conditions were better able to differentiate between the 
attractive (M = 7.04), and unattractive (M = 4.201), options than were Dijksterhuis’ 
participants (attractive option M = 6.18, unattractive option M = 5.38). As in Experiment 
1, the decision task may have been too easy. I suspected that participants may not have 
assigned equivalent importance to all attribute statements. To investigate this possibility, 
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I conducted a pilot study of 116 car attribute statements, including 21 used by 
Dijksterhuis (Dijksterhuis et al., 2006). 
Pilot Study 
Eighty-one WWU undergraduate psychology students participated in exchange 
for partial course credit. Participants read each of the attribute statements in random 
order, and were asked to indicate their attitude concerning each statement via a 10-point 
Likert-type scale. For each question, 1 was anchored with the phrase “Extremely 
Negative” and 10 was anchored with the phrase “Extremely Positive”.  
WWU undergraduate students rated some of Dijksterhuis’ statements to be 
heavily influential while others were relatively unimportant. For instance, the statement 
“The car gets good gas mileage” received an average rating of 9.03 while the statement 
“The car is available in very few colors” received an average rating of only 5.07. 
Complete pilot study results can be found in Appendix E.  
It is likely, therefore, that participants in Experiment 2 disregarded unimportant 
statements and based their decisions only upon those that they considered to be 
important. Many of the researchers who have sought to replicate the unconscious thought 
effect have also used the attribute sentences provided in the supplementary information of 
Dijksterhuis’ 2006 paper. It is likely that differences in the way subject populations 
evaluate these sentences, may disrupt the effect.  
In Experiment 3, I excluded six of Dijksterhuis’ original attribute statements 
because they were excessively influential. I selected statements based on their average 
importance rating. I rejected statements that received average ratings above 8.24 or below 
3.19. I also rejected those in which the positive version of the statement was substantially 
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more or less influential than the negative version of the statement. For instance, the 
statement, “The car is available in very few colors” received an average rating of 5.04, 
but its positive counterpart, “The car is available in many different colors” received an 
average rating of 7.4.  I also excluded statements with larger standard deviations. 
Additionally, I excluded statements that contradicted other statements.   
Experiment 3 
As mentioned, Lassiter et al. (2009) observed that participants in the conscious 
thought condition performed best when given instructions to memorize the attribute 
statements and that those participants in the distraction condition performed best when 
instructed to form impressions of the various options. They also administered a Need-
For-Cognition-Scale, and found that participants with higher need for cognition were 
more successful in differentiating between the attractive and unattractive options than 
were participants with lower need for cognition. Accordingly, they have suggested that 
the unconscious thought effect does not result from an effortless process (as Dijksterhuis 
has argued), and that implicit preference is developed “online”, while participants read 
the attribute sentences. Unfortunately, they did not include an immediate-decision 
condition. Nor did they offer an explanation for why participants in the immediate-
decision condition would make less-desirable decisions than participants in the 
distraction condition. 
I suspect that Lassiter and colleagues were correct in thinking that implicit 
preference is developed while participants read the attribute statements. It also seems 
likely that participants in the conscious thought condition would tend to make decisions 
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in accordance with the output of their rational thought processes and disregard their 
implicit preference.  
Explicit memory deteriorates more quickly than implicit memory (Ebbinghaus, 
1885/1964; Korsakoff, 1889 as reported in Schacter, 1987; Claparede, 1911, as reported 
in Johnson et al., 1985; Johnson et al., 1985; Reber 1993). Therefore, as explicit memory 
is forgotten during the performance of the two-back task, implicit preference likely 
remains. The forgetting of explicit information may therefore encourage the behavioral 
expression of implicit knowledge. 
Relatively accurate explicit memory for the attribute sentences discourages 
participants in the immediate-decision condition from expressing their implicit 
preference. To investigate this hypothesis, I included a free-recall task in Experiment 3. I 
predicted that participants in the immediate-decision condition would demonstrate better 
free-recall performance than participants in the distraction condition and would also 
demonstrate less-accurate preference for the attractive option.  
Additionally, if the behavioral expression of this preference is moderated by 
thought condition, it is likely that it could also be moderated by task instructions. To 
investigate this hypothesis in the rating task I asked half of the participants to report their 
feelings concerning each option and half to report their attitudes. I predicted that when 
encouraged to describe their feelings, participants in all thought conditions would make 
better decisions than participants encouraged to describe their attitudes. 
In order to investigate the possibility that the duration of the distraction task might 
affect the unconscious thought effect, I included distraction conditions of 1, 2.5 and 4 
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minutes in duration. I had no a priori predictions about the relative performance of 
participants in each of these distraction conditions. 
It is well known that explicit memory can be affected by the order in which items 
are presented (Deese & Kaufman, 1957). Order effects may also influence preference 
(Mayo & Crocket, 1964). When asked to recall a list of stimuli immediately after it been 
presented, participants typically demonstrate primacy and recency effects; they tend to 
remember stimuli that appeared early and late in the stimulus display. After a period of 
delay, recency effects typically disappear and participants tend to demonstrate primacy 
effects. Order effects, therefore, may differentially influence participants in the various 
thought condition. Participants in the immediate-decision condition might be influenced 
by primacy and recency effects while participants in the distraction condition might be 
influenced most strongly by primacy effects. 
To investigate this hypothesis, it would be necessary to manipulate the order of 
attribute statements. In Experiment 3, I did not do this, but instead investigated 
correlations between the presented order of attribute sentences and preference in an effort 
to provide justification for future research. 
Method  
Participants and materials. One-hundred and ninety-three undergraduate 
psychology students at WWU participated in exchange for partial course credit. 
Assignment to thought condition was randomly determined. 
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Procedure.  
Practice blocks. As in Experiments 1 and 2, all participants performed a practice 
two-back task and a practice semantic priming task before the attribute display. Practice 
blocks were as outlined above.  
Initial instructions. After completing the practice blocks, participants were 
informed that they had completed the practice blocks, and that the experiment was about 
to start. They were informed that they would be shown sentences describing four 
different cars: the “Nabusi”, the “Dasuka”, the “Kaiwa”, and the “Hatsdun”. Before 
reading the attribute statements, participants received instructions to form impressions of 
each car. Complete instructions can be found in Appendix F. 
Timing and format. Each of the 48 attribute sentences (available in Appendix G) 
were presented in random order in the center of the computer screen for 4 seconds. After 
these sentences had been displayed, participants were divided into 5 thought conditions: 
immediate-decision, conscious thought, 1 minute distraction, 2.5 minute distraction or 4 
minute distraction. Participants in the immediate-decision condition were asked to make 
decisions immediately after the sentences had been displayed. Participants in the 
conscious-thought condition were given four minutes to deliberate and were instructed to 
"Please take this time to think very carefully about the advantages and disadvantages of 
each car."  
After completing the requirements of the various thought conditions, participants 
were asked to rate the attractiveness of the various cars via a 10-point Likert-type scale. 
They were either asked to rate their attitude (e.g., “Please indicate your attitude 
concerning the Hatsdun”) or were asked to rate their feelings concerning each option 
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(e.g., "Please describe your feelings concerning the Hatsdun"). For both sets of 
instructions, the Likert scales were identical; 1 was anchored with “Extremely Negative” 
and 10 was anchored with “Extremely Positive”.  
After rating each of the options, participants performed a free-recall task for the 
positive and negative features of each car. Participants then identified the best car and 
indicated their confidence in this choice.  
Results  
Rating task. Across all thought conditions, there was a significant main effect of 
car, F(3,564) = 18.61, MSE = 3.26, p < .01, partial η2 = .09. However, the observed 
pattern did not follow the normative pattern perfectly. The attractive car (M = 6.24, 
SD=1.89) was rated as more attractive than the second moderately attractive car (M = 
6.08, SD = 1.69). The second moderately attractive car was rated as more attractive than 
the first moderately attractive car (M = 5.09, SD = 1.783). The unattractive car (M = 
5.23, SD = 1.74), however, was rated as more attractive than the second moderately 
attractive car. This deviation from the normative ranking likely reflects the increased 
difficulty of the decision task that may have resulted from the use of attribute statements 
with minimal importance.  
There was no significant main effect of thought condition F(4,188) = 1.93, MSE 
= 3.83, p=.11, partial η2=.04. The interaction between option and thought condition was 
also not significant F(12, 564) = 1.15, MSE = 3.26, p=.32, partial η2=.02. Cell means 
can be found in Table 11.  
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There was no main effect of rating task instructions (attitude vs. feel), F(1, 183) = 
.2, p=.65, partial η2 <.01. There was also no interaction between rating task instructions 
and thought condition F(4, 183) = .19, p=.94, partial η2 < .01.  
For all participants there was no significant main effect of option on latency in the 
rating task, F(3,564) = 1.88, MSE = 2.26, p = .13, partial η2= .01. There was no 
significant main effect of thought condition, F(4,188) = 1.34, MSE = 2.30, p = .26, 
partial η
2
 = .03. There was also no significant interaction, F(12,564), = .96, MSE = 2.26, 
p=.49, partial η2 = .02.  These results provide evidence that participants in immediate 
decision and distraction conditions did not spend more time deliberating after completing 
the requirements of the various thought conditions than did participants in the conscious 
thought condition. 
Free-recall task. On average, participants recalled only 24% of the attribute 
statements (M = 11.68, SD = 4.92). For participants in all thought conditions, there was a 
significant main effect of car on the total number of attribute statements correctly 
recalled, F(3, 555) = 12.23, MSE =0.02, p < .01, partial η2 = .06.  Participant recalled the 
most attribute statements describing the attractive option (M = 28.68%). Participants 
recalled fewer attribute statements describing the first (M = 24.08%) and second (M = 
23.95%) moderately-attractive options. They recalled the fewest statements concerning 
the unattractive option (M = 21.00%) There was no effect of thought condition, F(4, 185) 
= 1.97, MSE = 0.04, p = .43, partial η2 = .02. The interaction was not significant F(12, 
555) = 1.07, MSE = 0.02, p = .39, partial η2 = .02. Cell means can be found in Table 12. 
 For participants in all thought conditions, there was a significant main effect of 
car on the number of positive attribute statements correctly recalled, F(3, 537) = 56.63, 
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MSE <  0.01, p < .01, partial η2 = .24. Participants recalled the greatest percentage of 
positive attribute sentences describing the attractive option (M = 19.18%). They recalled 
fewer attribute statements describing the first (M = 13.04%) and second (M = 12.63%) 
moderately attractive options. They recalled the fewest attribute statements describing the 
unattractive option (M = 7%). There was no significant main effect of thought condition, 
F(4, 179) = 0.403, MSE = 0.01, p = .81, partial η2 < .01. There was also no interaction, 
F(12, 537)=1.07, MSE < 0.01, p = .38, partial η2 = .02.  Cell means can be found in 
Table 13. 
For participants in all thought conditions, there was a significant main effect of 
car on the percentage of negative attribute statements recalled, F(3, 540) = 7.39, MSE = 
0.01,  p < .01, partial η2=.04. All participants tended to recall more negative attributes 
about the unattractive car (M = 14%) than the first (M = 11.56%) and second (M = 12%) 
moderately attractive cars. They recalled the fewest negative statements about the 
attractive car (M = 10.13%). There was no significant main effect of thought condition, 
F(4, 180) = .46, MSE = 0.01, p = .76, partial η2 = .01. The interaction approached 
significance, F(12, 540) = 1.75, MSE = 0.01, p = .05, partial η2 = .04. A graph of the 
interaction can be found in Figure 4. Cell means can be found in Table 14. 
Intrusions. Intrusions were defined as any incorrect attribute recalled describing a 
particular option. For participants in all thought conditions, there was no significant main 
effect of car on the total number of intrusions recalled, F(3,555) = 1.63, MSE = 1.43, p = 
.18, partial η2 = .01. There was also no main effect of thought condition, F(4,185) = .53, 
p= .71, partial η2= .01. There was also no interaction, F(12, 555) = 1.11, MSE = 1.43,  p 
= .35, partial η2=.02. Cell means can be found in Table 15. 
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For participants in all thought conditions, there was a significant main effect of 
car on the number of positive intrusions recalled, F(3,537) = 13.01, MSE = 0.67, p < .01, 
partial η
2 
= .07. All participants had more positive intrusions for the unattractive car (M 
= 1.18, SD = 1.05) than the two moderately attractive cars (Means = 0.81 and 0.94, SD’s 
= 0.84 and 0.85). They displayed fewest positive intrusions for the attractive car (M = 
0.64, SD = 0.8). There was no significant main effect of thought condition, F(4, 179) = 
1.28, MSE = 1.13, p = .28, partial η2= .03. There was also no interaction, F(12, 537) = 
1.11, MSE = 0.67, p = .35, partial η2 = .02. Cell means can be found in Table 16. 
For participants in all thought conditions, there was a significant main effect of 
car on the number of negative intrusions recalled F(3, 540) = 3.71, MSE = 0.64, p = .01, 
partial η
2
 = .02. Participants in all thought conditions tended to have more negative 
intrusions for the attractive option (M = 0.91, SD = 0.84) and the first moderately-
attractive option (M = 0.91, SD=1.00) than the second moderately attractive option (M = 
0.81, SD = 0.78). Participants had the fewest negative intrusions for the unattractive 
option (M = 0.65, SD = 0.82), There was no significant main effect of thought condition, 
F(4, 180) = .49, MSE = 1.03, p = .74, partial η2 = .01. The interaction was significant, 
F(12, 540) = 2.26, MSE = 0.64, p = .01, partial η2 = .05. While participants in the 
immediate-decision, conscious thought and 2.5 minute distraction conditions tended to 
recall more negative intrusions concerning the attractive option than the unattractive 
option, participants in the 1-minute distraction and 4-minute distraction conditions tended 
to recall more negative attributes concerning the unattractive option than the attractive 
option. Cell means can be found in Table 17. 
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   Choice task.. Participants in the 2.5 minute distraction condition chose the 
attractive car most frequently (M = 57%), χ2(4, n = 190) = 8.62, p = .07, phi =0.21. 
Participants in the 4-minute distraction condition chose the attractive option slightly less 
frequently (M = 50%). Participants in the 1-minute distraction condition (M = 41%) 
chose the attractive option less frequently than participants in the 4-minute distraction 
condition. Participants in the conscious thought (M = 31%) and immediate-decision (M = 
31%) conditions identified the attractive option least frequently (Figure 2, Table 18).  
 When the distraction conditions were condensed, the effect of thought condition 
on choice reached significance, χ2(2, n = 190) = 6.72, p = .04, phi = .187. Participants in 
the distraction conditions (M=50%) tended to choose the attractive option more 
frequently than participants in the conscious thought (M = 31%) or immediate-decision 
(M = 31%) conditions. Complete results can be found in Table 19. 
To investigate the unconscious thought effect specifically, I conducted a number 
of simple effects analyses. I compared the proportion of participants in each distraction 
condition who identified the attractive car to the proportion of participants in the 
immediate-decision condition who chose the attractive car. 
          Immediate-decision condition vs. 1-minute distraction condition. There was no 
difference in the ratio of participants who chose the attractive option in the immediate-
decision and 1 minute distraction conditions, χ2(1, n = 79) = .86, p = .35, phi = .10.  
          Immediate-decision condition vs. 2.5 -minute distraction condition. There was a 
significant difference in the proportion of participants who chose the attractive option in 
the immediate-decision and the 2.5 minute distraction conditions, χ2(1, n = 91) = 5.962, p 
= .02, phi= .26. Of the 45 participants in the immediate-decision condition, 31% chose 
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the attractive option. Of the 46 participants in the 2.5 minute distraction condition, 57% 
chose the attractive option. As more participants in the 2.5 minute distraction condition 
chose the attractive car than did participants in the immediate-decision condition, this 
finding lends support to the unconscious thought effect.  
          Immediate-decision condition vs. 4 -minute distraction condition. There was a 
difference that approached significance in the proportion of participants who chose the 
attractive option in the immediate-decision and the 4- minute distraction conditions, χ2(1, 
n = 77) = 2.81, p = .09, phi= .19. Of the 45 participants in the immediate-decision 
condition, 45% chose the attractive option. Of the 32 participants in the 4-minute 
distraction condition, 50% chose the attractive option.  
Immediate-decision condition vs. conscious-thought condition. To investigate 
whether participants in the conscious thought condition demonstrated relatively poor 
preference, I compared the proportion of participants in this condition who chose the 
attractive car to the proportion of participants in the immediate-decision condition who 
chose the attractive car. There was no significant difference in the proportion of 
participants who chose the attractive option in the immediate-decision and the conscious-
thought conditions, χ2(1, N = 80) < .01, p = .98, phi < .01.  
 Confidence. Between thought conditions, participants did not indicate significant 
differences in their confidence concerning their choice of the best car, F(4,97) = .45, 
MSE = 0.85, p = .77, partial η2 = .02.  
Post-hoc analyses. I originally predicted that participants with better free-recall 
performance would be less likely to make decisions in accordance with their implicit 
preference. Accordingly, I predicted that participants with relatively accurate explicit 
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memory would be less likely to choose the attractive car or rate it highly. I predicted that 
conditions in which a higher proportion of participants chose the attractive car, 
participants would also tend to recall fewer attribute statements for the attractive car. In 
the choice task, a greater proportion of participants in the 2.5-minute distraction condition 
tended to choose the attractive option than did participants in the immediate-decision 
condition. When I compared the number of attribute statements describing the attractive 
car correctly recalled between these two conditions, I found that participants in the 
immediate-decision condition recalled significantly more attributes than did participants 
in the 2.5 minute distraction condition, F(1,270) = 5.49, MSE = 2.29, p = .02 (Figure 3). 
Between these three thought conditions, there were no significant differences in the 
number of attribute statements correctly recalled describing any of the other options  
There was no significant difference in the proportion of participants who chose 
the attractive option in the conscious-thought and immediate-decision conditions. 
Similarly, there was no significant difference in the number of correctly recalled attribute 
statements describing the attractive option, F(1,270) = 0.56, MSE = 2.29, p = .45. 
  Relationship between rating score and number of attribute sentences correctly 
recalled. Participants in all thought conditions who rated the attractive option more 
favorably tended to recall a greater number of correct attribute statements describing it 
than did participants who rated it less-favorably, r(187) = 26, p < .01. Additionally, 
participants who tended to rate the second-moderately attractive option favorably also 
tended to recall a greater number of attribute statements describing it than participants 
who rated it less-favorably, r(187) = .22, p=.03.  
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In the immediate-decision condition, participants who tended to rate the attractive 
option more favorable also tended to recall a greater number of correct attribute 
statements describing it than participants who rated it less-favorable, r(28) = .37, p = .04. 
Participants who rated the second-moderately attractive option more favorable also 
tended to recall a greater number of correct attribute statement describing it, r(28) = .62, 
p < .01.  No relevant correlations were significant in the conscious thought condition.  
In the 1-minute distraction condition participants who rated the attractive option 
more favorable also tended to recall a greater number of correct attribute statements 
describing it than participants who rated it less favorable, r(61) = .28, p = .03. This 
relationship was also true for the second moderately-attractive option. Participants who 
rated this option more favorable also tended to recall a greater number of correct attribute 
statements, r(61) = .26, p = .04.  
In the 2.5 minute and 4-minute distraction conditions, no relevant correlations 
were significant. These findings suggest that in the conscious thought, immediate-
decision and 1-minute distraction conditions, participants who recall a greater number of 
attribute sentences also tend to display better preference. Lassiter has demonstrated that 
participants in the conscious thought condition tend to display better preference when 
instructed to memorize the attribute statements than when instructed to form impressions 
of the various options. This finding provides evidence that accurate explicit memory can 
facilitate the accuracy of preference for participants who make decisions in accordance 
with conscious thought processes.  
It is interesting to note that no relevant correlations were found in the 2.5 and 4-
minute distraction conditions. These were the conditions in which I found evidence 
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supporting the unconscious thought effect in the choice task. Although there was no 
significant evidence of unconscious thought in the rating task, the lack of relevant 
correlations with free-recall task performance provides evidence that the these 
participants did not engage in rational analysis of the attribute statements. 
Order effects. Order effects were coded as positive or negative primacy and 
recency scores. Of the 12 attribute statements used to describe an option, primacy scores 
reflect the number of positive or negative attribute sentences that occurred first.  
The order of the 12 attribute statements used to describe each option was coded as 
primacy and recency scores. Primacy scores represent the number of positive or negative 
attribute sentences that were presented first in the list. For example a score of +4 would 
mean that four positive statements describing a particular option were presented before 
the first negative sentence. A score of -4 would mean that four negative statements 
preceded the first positive statement. Similarly, recency scores represent the number of 
positive or negative attribute statements presented at the end of the 12 attribute statement 
list  used to describe a particular option. An “order” score was also calculated for each 
option by summing the primacy and recency scores. 
  Across all 5 thought conditions, only the attractive option recency score was 
significantly correlated with its rating, r(184) = .15, p = .04. Correlations can be found in 
Table 21. 
In the immediate-decision condition, no relevant comparisons were significantly 
correlated, however, a positive relationship between the attractive option rating and the 
order score approached significance, r(43) = .25, p = .09. A negative relationship 
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between the attractive option rating and the unattractive primacy score also approached 
significance, r(43) = -.254, p = .09. Correlations can be found in Table 22. 
 In the conscious thought condition, there was a marginally significant positive 
relationship between the rating for the first moderately-attractive option and its primacy 
score r(30) = .33, p = .08. Correlations can be found in Table 23. In the 1-minute 
distraction condition, several correlations approached significance. A negative 
relationship between the unattractive option rating and its recency score approached 
significance, r(29) = -.30, p = .10. A negative relationship between the unattractive 
option rating score and the attractive option order score also approached significance, 
r(29) = -.33, p = .07. Correlations can be found in Table 24. 
 In the 2.5-minute distraction condition, the negative relationship between the 
moderately-attractive rating and its order score approached significance, r(44) = -.26, p = 
.08. Correlations can be found in Table 25. In the 4-minute distraction condition, the 
positive relationship between the attractive option rating and its primacy score was 
significant, r(30) = .42, p = .02. Correlations can be found in Table 26. 
Discussion 
In the rating task, participants were able to differentiate between the cars, so the 
attribute display was not overly complicated. Participants held only slightly stronger 
preference for the attractive (M = 6.24), and unattractive options (M = 5.23) than did 
Dijksterhuis’ participants (attractive option M = 6.18, unattractive option M = 5.38). 
However, I was unsuccessful in replicating Dijksterhuis’ unconscious thought effect in 
the rating task; the critical interaction between thought condition and option was not 
present in this task. Rating task instructions (attitude vs. feel) also did not affect ratings 
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for the various cars. However, a significantly higher proportion of participants in the 2.5 
minute distraction condition chose the attractive option than participants in the 
immediate-decision or conscious thought conditions.  
 It is unclear why the key interaction between thought condition and option was 
significant in the choice task but not significant in the rating task. It is possible that there 
was less pressure to select the correct answer in the ratings task than in the choice task. 
Therefore, participants in all thought conditions, including the conscious thought and 
immediate-decision conditions might be more likely to make decisions based upon 
implicit preference when rating each option than when choosing an option. More research 
is needed in this area. 
 In the free-recall task, there was no interaction between thought condition and 
option in the total number of attribute statements correctly recalled. However, the 
interaction concerning the number of negative attribute statement correctly recalled 
approached significance. In addition, the interaction concerning the number of negative 
intrusions was significant. It is unclear why the key interaction was significant for 
negative statements, but not for positive statements. More research is needed in this area. 
 As mentioned, a significantly higher ratio of participants in the 2.5 minute 
distraction condition chose the attractive option than in the immediate-decision condition. 
A higher ratio of participants in the 4-minute distraction condition also tended to identify 
the attractive option than in the immediate-decision condition, however, this effect was 
only marginally significant. I interpreted these findings in support of the unconscious 
thought effect. 
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 Participants in the 2.5 minute distraction condition also tended to recall fewer 
attribute statements describing the attractive option than did participants in the 
immediate-decision condition. I interpret these findings in support of my hypothesis that 
participants with better explicit knowledge may be less-likely to act in accordance with 
their implicit preference. It is unclear why there was a positive relationship between 
explicit knowledge and rating for a particular option. This finding seems to contradict my 
hypothesis. However, the unconscious thought effect was not apparent in the rating task, 
and it is unknown whether the direction of these relationships would change if the 
unconscious thought effect were found.  
I investigated the hypothesis that rating task directions might influence the effect. 
I encouraged some participants to express their attitudes and encouraged others to express 
their feelings. There were no significant differences in rating task performance between 
these two groups. It is possible that this manipulation was insufficient to affect the 
results. Future researchers may wish to include more elaborate instructions either 
encouraging participants to make decisions in accordance with their “gut feeling” or 
based on conscious processes. 
 Ratings for several options were significantly correlated with indices representing 
the order in which attribute statements were presented. Future researchers may wish to 
manipulate the presentation order of attribute statements. If it is possible to control the 
unconscious thought effect via the presented order of attributes, this will also provide 
evidence that preference is developed only “online”, as participants read the attribute 
statements. 
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General Discussion  
Dijksterhuis has argued that the unconscious thought effect necessitates the 
existence of an unconscious cognitive process that is capable of actively processing 
attribute information even while participants are distracted with the performance of an 
unrelated task. Dijksterhuis wrote that “unconscious thought is expected to turn an 
initial, disorganized set of information into a clearer and more integrated representation 
of information in memory…unconscious thought leads to representations that become 
more polarized” (2004, p.593). I conducted the experiments described above to 
investigate a somewhat more parsimonious explanation; that participants develop implicit 
preference as they read the attribute sentences and that the behavioral expression of this 
preference is moderated by thought condition.  
Many researchers (Bechara & Damasio, 2005; Bechara, Tanel, & Damasio, 1997; 
Betsch et al., 2001; Johnson et al., 1985; Murphy & Zajonc, 1993; Wilson & Schooler, 
1991; Zajonc, 1968) have observed that implicit preference develops as participants 
perceive attribute information, and that this preference can often persist even after 
participants no longer have declarative knowledge of the attribute information. Betsch 
and colleagues (2009) have demonstrated that the process of implicit preference 
development is summative. Because Dijksterhuis operationally defines the attractiveness 
of a given option by the ratio of its positive and negative attributes, participants who 
engage in a summative evaluative process will be more likely to make decisions in 
accordance with this operationally-defined normative ranking than participants who do 
not consider all attribute sentences. I therefore hypothesized that participants who heeded 
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their “gut feelings” would be more likely to make decisions in accordance with this 
normative ranking than participants who engaged in rational thought.  
Dijksterhuis has reported several successful replications of the unconscious 
thought effect. As his experimental paradigm requires that participants treat the various 
attribute statements with equal importance, researchers should conduct pilot studies to 
determine how their participants will evaluate the attribute statements. I found that WWU 
undergraduate students considered some of Dijksterhuis’ attribute statements to be highly 
important and considered others to be highly unimportant. Participants in Experiment 2, 
therefore, may have disregarded those statements that they considered to be highly 
unimportant , and may have based their decisions only upon those attribute statements 
that they considered to be important. In Experiment 3, I presented only attribute 
statements that the WWU undergraduate population had rated as moderately-important 
via the pilot study, and obtained my best results. 
In three experiments, I investigated the hypothesis that implicit preference 
develops while participants read the attribute statements, and that the behavioral 
expression of this preference is moderated by thought condition. In Experiments 1 and 2, 
I investigated the hypothesis that implicit preference, as measured via a semantic priming 
task performance, does not change during the performance of the two-back task. As 
predicted, the interaction between option, target and thought condition was not significant 
in either experiment. This finding is somewhat meaningless, however, as I was 
unsuccessful in replicating the unconscious thought effect via the choice or rating tasks. 
In Experiment 3, I investigated the hypothesis that relatively accurate explicit 
memory for attribute statements might discourage participants from making decisions 
 
 
46 
 
based on “gut feeling”. I predicted that participants in the immediate-decision condition 
would be able to recall a greater number of attribute statements than participants in the 
distraction condition, and therefore would also be more likely to make decisions based on 
conscious processes.  
I found that participants in the distraction condition did tend to recall fewer 
correct attribute statements than participants in the immediate-decision condition. 
Additionally, a larger proportion of participants in the distraction condition chose the 
attractive option than in the immediate-decision condition. I interpret these results in 
support of my conjecture that the behavioral expression of implicit knowledge may be 
moderated by explicit knowledge. 
 It is unclear why I was successful in replicating the unconscious thought effect via 
the choice task, but unsuccessful in doing so via the rating task. In addition, and contrary 
to my hypothesis, I found a positive correlation between the number of correct attribute 
statements recalled and the strength of expressed preference for the attractive option. It is, 
however, possible that the direction of this relationship would change if I had been 
successful in replicating the unconscious thought effect via the rating task. 
 Future researchers may wish to include multiple dependent variables in their 
experiments, as my results seem to indicate that the unconscious thought effect can be 
moderated by task type. 
In addition, it may be valuable to manipulate instructions for tasks occurring after 
the performance of the various thought conditions. In Experiment 3, I encouraged one 
group of participants to report their attitudes, and another group of participants to 
describe their feelings concerning the various options. I found no differences in rating 
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task performance between these two groups; however, differences between these sets of 
instructions may have been insufficient to affect rating task performance.  
In Experiment 3, I found a number of significant correlations between indices 
representing the order in which attribute statements describing a particular option were 
presented and option ratings. It may be possible to influence preference for the various 
options through manipulation of attribute statements presentation order. 
With increasing duration of the distraction condition, explicit memory for the 
attribute statements will fade. Implicit preference, however, will likely remain. If the 
behavioral expression of implicit preference is moderated by explicit knowledge, then 
after several days, when almost all explicit knowledge has been forgotten, participants 
may still be able to demonstrate accurate preference. However, participants encouraged 
to engage in conscious thought prior to making their decisions, might display relatively 
deleterious preference. Increase in the duration of the distraction condition may allow 
researchers to use attribute statements of greater importance. 
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Figure 2.  
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Figure 4. 
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Appendix A 
Attribute Statements Used in Experiment 1 
 
Attractive Option 
 1 = "The Canterbury apartment has fresh paint" 
 2 = "The Canterbury apartment has good parking" 
 3 = "The Canterbury apartment has a washing machine" 
 4 = "The Canterbury has modern appliances" 
 5 = "The Canterbury neighborhood is very nice" 
 6= "The landlord at the Canterbury is really nice" 
 7 = "The Canterbury is close to a bus line" 
 8 = "The storage at the Canterbury apartment is good" 
 9 = "The bedroom at the Canterbury apartment is small" 
10 = "The Canterbury apartment is fairly small" 
 11 = "The Canterbury apartment is not very close to a grocery store" 
 12= "The Canterbury apartment has no air conditioning" 
First Moderately Attractive Option 
 1 = "The landlord of the Brandywine apartment is friendly" 
 2 = "Your would-be neighbors at the Brandywine are very friendly" 
 3 = "The Brandywine apartment has a washing machine" 
 4 = "The Brandywine apartment has a balcony" 
 5 = "There is good parking at the Brandywine" 
 6 = "The Brandywine apartment has fresh paint" 
 7 = "Your friends don't live very close to the Brandywine apartment" 
 8 = "The Brandywine apartment is in an unattractive building" 
 9 = "There is not much storage at the Brandywine" 
10 = "The refrigerator is a bit leaky at the Brandywine" 
 11 = "The Brandywine does not have a dishwasher" 
12= "The kitchen in the Brandywine is a bit small" 
Second Moderately Attractive Option 
 1 = "There is a fireplace at the Albermarle" 
 2 = "There is a good gym at the Albermarle apartment" 
 3 = "The Albermarle has a dishwasher" 
 4 = "The Albermarle apartment is in an attractive building" 
 5 = "The carpet at the Albermarle is new" 
 6 = "The kitchen in the Albermarle is quite large" 
 7 = "The landlord at the Albermarle is a bit unfriendly" 
 8 = "There is a poor view at the Albermarle" 
 9 = "There is no washing machine at the Albermarle" 
10 = "There is not much storage at the Albermarle" 
 11 = "The Albermarle is not very close to a grocery store" 
12= "The bedroom at the Albermarle is a bit small" 
Unattractive Option 
 1 = "The Heatherstone apartment is fairly large" 
 2 = " The Heatherstone is close to a grocery store" 
 3 = "Your friends live close to the Heatherstone apartment" 
 4 = "The Heatherstone has a washing machine" 
 5 = "The Heatherstone is somewhat noisy" 
 6 = "The Heatherstone is located on a busy street" 
 7 = "The Heatherstone has poor parking" 
 8 = "The carpet at the Heatherstone is a bit dirty" 
 9 = "The Heatherstone apartment has outdated appliances" 
10 = "The Heatherstone has thin walls" 
 11 = "The Heatherstone has no dishwasher" 
 12 = "The Heatherstone has limited hot water" 
 
 
76 
 
Appendix B 
Instructions Used in Experiment 1 
First Page 
Welcome to the "Apartment Experiment" 
We would like to examine how people make complex decisions. 
In this experiment, we will look at apartment choices. You will be presented with a list of sentences 
describing various apartments, and will be asked to make decisions based upon this information.  
You will also be asked to participate in two different kinds of tasks. The "2" Back task and the "Reaction 
Time" task. 
When you are ready, we will begin by practicing these two tasks. 
 
Two Pages Prior to Attribute Statement Display Block 
Great! You have completed the training. We can now begin the experiment. 
In the next step, you will be shown many sentences describing 4 different apartments:  
The "Brandywine", the "Albermarle", the "Heatherstone", and the "Canterbury". 
Your job is to remember this information, and form an impression of each apartment.  
You will be asked about your preferences and memory for each apartment later in the experiment. 
 
One-Page Prior to the Attribute Statement Display Block 
You will not need to press any buttons. Just do your best to remember the information.  
If you have any questions, please ask the experimenter now. 
If you are ready to begin the presentation, please press the right colored key ("R") 
 
Conscious Thought Condition Instructions 
"You now have 3 minutes to think very carefully about your preferences for the 4 apartments." 
 
Rating Task: 
 1 = "Please rate the attractiveness of the Albermarle apartment:" 
 2= "Please rate the attractiveness of the Brandywine apartment:" 
 3="Please rate the attractiveness of the Canterbury apartment:" 
 4="Please rate the attractiveness of the Heatherstone apartment:" 
 
Rating Task Anchors 
1 ="Extremely Unattractive"; 2="Very Unattractive "; 3="Unattractive";4="Somewhat 
Unattractive";5="Slightly Unattractive"; 6="Slightly Attractive";7="Somewhat 
attractive";8="Attractive";9="Very Attractive";10="Extremely Attractive" 
 
Choice Task 
“Of the four apartments (The Brandywine, the Heatherstone, the Canterbury and the Albermarle) which 
would you choose?” 
 
Confidence Task 
"How confident are you that this is the best apartment for you?" 
 
Confidence Task Anchors 
1="Not Confident at All";2="Not Very Confident";3="Moderately Confident";4="Very Confident"; 
5="Completely Confident" 
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Appendix C 
Instructions Used in Experiment 2 
 
First Page 
Welcome to the "Car Buying Experiment”. 
We would like to examine how people make complex decisions. 
In this experiment, we will look at car choices. You will be presented with a list of sentences describing 
various cars, and will be asked to choose the best car.  
You will also be asked to participate in two different kinds of tasks. The "2-Back" task and the "Reaction 
Time" task. 
When you are ready, we will begin by practicing these two tasks. 
 
Two-Pages Prior to the Attribute Statement Display Block 
Great! You have completed the training. We can now begin the experiment. 
In the next step, you will be shown many sentences describing 4 different cars:  
The "Nabusi", the "Dasuka", the "Kaiwa", and the "Hatsdun". 
Your job is to choose the best car.  
 
One Page Prior to Attribute Statement Display Block 
You will not need to press any buttons. Just do your best to remember the information.  
If you have any questions, please ask the experimenter now. 
If you are ready to begin the presentation, please press the right colored key ("R"). 
 
Conscious Thought  
 "Please take this time to think very carefully about the cars" 
 
Rating Task  
1 = "Please indicate your attitude concerning the Hatsdun:" 
2= "Please indicate your attitude concerning the Kaiwa:" 
3="Please indicate your attitude concerning the Dasuka:" 
4="Please indicate your attitude concerning the Nabusi:" 
 
Rating Task Anchors 
1 ="Extremely Negative"; 2="Very Negative "; 3="Negative";4="Somewhat Negative";5="Slightly 
Nevative"; 6="Slightly Positive";7="Somewhat Positive";8="Positive";9="Very Positive";10="Extremely 
Positive"] 
  
Confidence Task 
"How confident are you that this is the best car for you?" 
 
Confidence Task Anchors 
1="Not Confident at All";2="Not Very Confident";3="Moderately Confident";4="Very Confident"; 
5="Completely Confident" 
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Appendix D 
Attribute Statements Used in Experiment 2 
 
Attractive Option 
1 = "The Hatsdun has good mileage" 
2 = "The Hatsdun has good handling" 
3 = "The Hatsdun has a large trunk" 
4 = "The Hatsdun is very new" 
5 = "The Hatsdun is available in many different colors" 
6 = "For the Hatsdun service is excellent" 
7 = "The Hatsdun has poor legroom" 
8 = "With the Hatsdun it is difficult to shift gears" 
9 = "The Hatsdun has cupholders" 
10 = "The Hatsdun has a sunroof" 
11 = "The Hatsdun is relatively good for the environment" 
12= "The Hatsdun has a poor sound system" 
First Moderately Attractive Option 
1 = " The Kaiwa has good mileage" 
2 = " The Kaiwa has poor handling" 
3 = " The Kaiwa has a large trunk" 
4 = " For the Kaiwa service is excellent" 
5 = "The Kaiwa is available in many different colors" 
6= " The Kaiwa has plenty of legroom" 
7 = " With the Kaiwa it is easy to shift gears" 
8 = " The Kaiwa has no cupholders" 
9 = "The Kaiwa has no sunroof" 
10 = " The Kaiwa is fairly good for the environment" 
11 = " The Kaiwa has a poor sound system" 
12= " The Kaiwa is old" 
Second Moderately Attractive Option 
1 = " The Dasuka has poor mileage" 
2 = " The Dasuka has good handling" 
3 = " The Dasuka has a small trunk" 
4 = " The Dasuka is available in very few colors" 
5 = " For the Dasuka service is poor" 
6= " The Dasuka has little legroom" 
7 = " With the Dasuka it is easy to shift gears" 
8 = " The Dasuka has cupholders" 
9 = " The Dasuka has a sunroof" 
10 = " The Dasuka is not very good for the environment" 
11 = " The Dasuka has a good sound system" 
12= " The Dasuka is new" 
Unattractive Option 
1 = " The Nabusi has poor mileage" 
2 = " The Nabusi has poor handling" 
3 = " The Nabusi has a small trunk" 
4 = " The Nabusi is available in many different colors" 
5 = " For the Nabusi service is poor" 
6= " The Nabusi has plenty of legroom" 
7 = " With the Nabusi it is difficult to shift gears" 
8 = " The Nabusi has no cupholders" 
9 = " The Nabusi has a sunroof" 
10 = " The Nabusi is not very good for the environment" 
11 = " The Nabusi has a poor sound system" 
12= " The Nabusi is old" 
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Appendix E 
Pilot Study Results 
Attribute sentences are presented in order of mean rating of importance. Sentences in rows labeled 
“Dijksterhuis” were used by Dijksterhuis and colleagues (2006b). They were also used in my second 
experiment. Sentences in rows labeled “Exp. 3”represent sentences selected for inclusion in Experiment 3. 
Some of Dijksterhuis’ attribute statements were considered to be very important while others were 
considered to be very unimportant. 
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Appendix F 
Instructions Used in Experiment 3 
 
First Page: 
Welcome to the "Car Buying Experiment". 
We would like to examine how people make complex decisions. 
In this experiment, we will look at car choices. You will be presented with a list of sentences describing 
various cars.  
You will be asked to form an impression of each car so that you will be able to choose the best.  
You will also be asked to participate in the "2-Back" task. 
When you are ready, we will begin by practicing this task. 
 
One Page Prior to Attribute Statement Display Block 
Great! You have completed the training. We can now begin the experiment. 
In the next step, you will be shown many sentences describing 4 different cars:  
The "Nabusi", the "Dasuka", the "Kaiwa", and the "Hatsdun". 
Your job is to form an impression of each car so that you will be able to choose the best.  
You will not need to press any buttons.   
If you have any questions, please ask the experimenter now. 
 
Conscious Thought  
"Please take this time to think very carefully about the advantages and disadvantages of each car.  
 
Rating Task  
 Attitude Instructions. 
1="Please indicate your attitude concerning the Hatsdun:" 
 2= "Please indicate your attitude concerning the Kaiwa:" 
 3="Please indicate your attitude concerning the Dasuka:" 
 4="Please indicate your attitude concerning the Nabusi:" 
 Feel Instructions. 
 1 = "Please describe your feelings concerning the Hatsdun" 
 2= "Please describe your feelings concerning the Kaiwa" 
 3="Please describe your feelings concerning the Dasuka" 
 4="Please describe your feelings concerning the Nabusi" 
 
Rating Task Anchors for Survey Feel and Survey Attitude 
1 ="Extremely Negative"; 2="Very Negative "; 3="Negative";4="Somewhat Negative";5="Slightly 
Negative"; 6="Slightly Positive";7="Somewhat Positive";8="Positive";9="Very Positive";10="Extremely 
Positive" 
  
Confidence Task 
"How confident are you that this is the best car for you?" 
 
Confidence Task Anchors 
1="Not Confident at All";2="Not Very Confident";3="Moderately Confident";4="Very Confident"; 
5="Completely Confident" 
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Appendix G 
Attribute Statements Used in Experiment 3 
Attractive Option 
1="The seller of the Hatsdun is friendly" 
2=" The Hatsdun has a nice interior " 
3=" The Hatsdun has cupholders" 
4=" It is very quiet inside the Hatsdun " 
5=" The Hatsdun has a pleasant smell" 
6=" The Hatsdun seats 4-5 people" 
7=" The Hatsdun has a good sound system " 
8=" The Hatsdun has good storage " 
9=" A friend of yours had a Hatsdun and frequently complained about it " 
10=" The Hatsdun has little legroom " 
11=" The air conditioning in the Hatsdun does not work well " 
12="With the Hatsdun it is difficult to shift gears " 
First Moderately-Attractive Option 
1="The Kaiwa has good legroom " 
2="The Kaiwa has cupholders " 
3=" The seller of the Kaiwa is friendly " 
4=" With the Kaiwa it is easy to shift gears " 
5=" The air conditioning in the Kaiwa works well " 
6=" The Kaiwa has a nice interior " 
7=" A friend of yours had a Kaiwa and frequently complained about it " 
8=" It is not very quiet inside the Kaiwa " 
9=" The Kaiwa has a faint unpleasant smell " 
10=" The Kaiwa has a poor sound system " 
11=" The Kaiwa has poor storage " 
12=" The Kaiwa seats only 2 people " 
Second Moderately-Attractive Option 
1="The Dasuka has a pleasant smell " 
2="The Dasuka has a good sound system " 
3="The Dasuka has good storage " 
4="The Dasuka seats 4-5 people " 
5=" A friend of yours had a Dasuka and raved about it " 
6=" It is very quiet inside the Dasuka " 
7=" The air conditioning in the Dasuka does not work well " 
8=" The Dasuka does not have a very nice interior " 
9=" The Dasuka has little legroom " 
10=" The Dasuka has no cupholders " 
11=" The seller of the Dasuka is rude " 
12=" With the Dasuka it is difficult to shift gears " 
Unattractive Option 
1=" A friend of yours had a Nabusi and raved about it" 
2=" The Nabusi has good legroom " 
3=" The air conditioning in the Nabusi works well " 
4=" With the Nabusi it is easy to shift gears " 
5=" The Nabusi has a faint unpleasant smell " 
6=" The Nabusi seats only 2 people " 
7=" The Nabusi has a poor sound system " 
8="The Nabusi has poor storage " 
9= "The seller of the Nabusi is rude " 
10= "The Nabusi does not have a very nice interior " 
11= "The Nabusi has no cupholders " 
12= "It is not very quiet inside the Nabusi " 
 
 
